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This article examines the proposition that all
digital data is hearsay in legal proceedings within
the United States of America. This article also
analyzes the inadequacy, if not outright failure, of
the current approaches to dealing with the
hearsay exception used to offer computer-
generated information into evidence. The author
proposes that until the Federal Rules of Evidence
are revised to reflect the ephemeral nature of
digital evidence, such evidence should be
considered hearsay and deemed inadmissible
unless a hearsay exclusionary exception is
successfully asserted. It is further proposed that if
admissibility of digital evidence is sought
pursuant to a hearsay exception, such evidence
should be made subject to heightened reliability
requirements.
Summary
Subject to certain exceptions not pertinent to this
discussion (unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues and
such like), all relevant evidence is generally considered
admissible once a proper foundation has been laid
pursuant to Rule 901 of The Federal Rules of Evidence
(F.R.E.).
Once authenticated, the F.R.E. provides that hearsay
evidence is generally inadmissible unless it falls under
an exception. The F.R.E. defines hearsay as ‘a statement,
other than one made by the declarant, while testifying
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
matter asserted.’1 The two hearsay exceptions generally
applicable to digital data embrace notions of
trustworthiness or reliability, and are commonly known
as the Business Records Exception found in F.R.E.
803(6) and the residual hearsay exception set forth in
F.R.E. Rule 807. These exceptions to the hearsay rule
generally require a showing of reliability (or in the case
of the business records exception, the lack of a
challenge in relation to reliability).
Since digital data is inherently ephemeral and
therefore not demonstrably reliable, there is a low bar
to attaining admissibility by operation of a hearsay
exception, that is by a literal adherence to current
requirements, which tends to reflect a service that is
proffered but not performed.2 Accordingly, these
approaches fall short of their intended objective
because the F.R.E. (and most judicial authority) does not
properly address reliability issues arising from the
inherently ephemeral nature of digital data. Although
this shortcoming has been documented since at least as
early as the 1970’s, the Federal Rules of Evidence have
not been amended to demand of a party seeking to
admit digital data that degree of reliability properly
reflective of the frailty of digital evidence.
Until the Federal Rules of Evidence are revised to
directly address the ephemeral nature of this new
specie of evidence, an argument may be made that all
digital data is hearsay, and that an affirmative showing
of reliability must be demonstrated if admissibility is to
be sought under an exception to the hearsay rule.
Although two United States Circuit Courts of Appeal
have rejected the comprehensive application of the
hearsay rule to all digital data, it is contended that well-
established authority from at least one prominent
Federal Circuit provides the constitutional basis for
deeming all digital data as hearsay. Moreover, and
despite the mostly orthogonal arguments made in
opposition, the undisputed nature of digital data itself
compels the conclusion that all digital data is hearsay.
Finally, this article examines the potential implications
of the application of the hearsay evidence rule to digital
evidence used in both the criminal and civil context.
Until the Federal Rules of Evidence are revised to
address information in digital format, the
‘trustworthiness’ standards set forth in F.R.E. Rule
803(6) and 807 hearsay exceptions, together with
recent judicial authority, provide the proper standards
for determination of authentication based on a positive
showing of ‘reliability’, and discuss how such an
emerging concept of ‘reliability’ should be used as the
primary condition for admissibility of digital data sought
be offered as evidence.
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1 Fed. R. Evid. Rule 801(c).
2 For instance, the well laid out arguments in George
Paul, Foundations of Digital Evidence, (ABA, 2008)
131-149; also Stephen Mason, Electronic Evidence:
Disclosure, Discovery & Admissibility (LexisNexis
Butterworths, 2007) Chapter 4.
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Background
Digital data is also known as ‘Electronically Stored
Information’ (ESI) for the purposes of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, for purposes of
uniformity, the terms ‘computer generated information,’
ESI, and ‘digital data,’ in any format and however
stored, are used interchangeably in this article.
The vast majority of information currently generated is
digital in nature.3 It follows that the vast majority of
information offered as evidence will also be digital in
nature, and this trend is reflected in the December 2006
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4
Digital data is inherently malleable, or ephemeral.5 The
inherently ephemeral nature of computer-generated
data creates new issues that have a significant and
detrimental effect on reliability, authentication and
ultimately on the issue of admissibility. To date, these
issues remain largely ignored by both the bench and the
bar, and directed into unsuitable definitions or relegated
to obsolescent analyses. The reason for this ignorance
or misapprehension is probably the result of a basic
misunderstanding of the nature of both computer-
generated information and the variable nature of the
computing environment by which such information is
generated. The result of this general misunderstanding
can be seen in the current mixture of judicial
approaches to the admissibility of digital evidence.6
It should be made clear at the outset that the F.R.E.
never refers to or directly addresses digital evidence.
The Federal Rules of Evidence predate by decades the
2006 electronic discovery amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and so it is not surprising that
the F.R.E. makes no mention of ESI. Despite the
approach of the thirtieth anniversary of near ubiquity,
however, the term ‘computer’ is notably missing from
the F.R.E. Moreover, even the authentication provisions
of Rule 901 refer generally to the accuracy of a ‘process
or system’ in producing a result7 without indicating
whether the process or system is a computer, or
whether the result is computer generated information.
The term ‘data compilation’ makes one of its rare
appearances in Article VIII F.R.E., and is expressly
included as a record of a regularly conducted activity
under what is commonly referred to as the ‘Business
Records’ exception to the hearsay rule. Judicial authority
generally supports the proposition that computer
generated information is a subset of the umbrella term
‘data compilation’ for purposes of analysis under the
business records exception:8
‘[Defendant] does not dispute the well established
proposition that “computer data compilations may
constitute business records for purposes of Rule
803(6), … and may be admitted at trial if a proper
foundation is established.” United States v. Croft, 750
F.2d 1354, 1364 (7th Cir.1984) (citing United States v.
Young Brothers, Inc., 728 F.2d 682, 694 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed.2d 184
(1984)).’ U.S. v. Hayes 861 F.2d 1225, *1228 (10th Cir.
1988).
‘A business record may include data stored
electronically on computers and later printed out for
presentation in court, so long as the original
computer data compilation was prepared pursuant to
a business duty in accordance with regular business
practice.’ Potamkin Cadillac Corp. v. B.R.I. Coverage
Corp., 38 F.3d 627, 632 (2d Cir.1994). Health Alliance
Network, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co. 245 F.R.D. 121,
*129 (S.D.N.Y., 2007).
A second appearance of the term ‘data compilation’
appears in F.R.E. Rule 901(b), but curiously, only from
within the context of authenticating a ‘Public Record’ or
‘Ancient Documents.’9 A final F.R.E. reference to ‘data
compilation’ is found in Rule 1001, which generally
requires that an original is required to prove the content
of a writing, recording or photograph.10 ‘Writing and
recordings’ are defined in pertinent part to include
‘letters, words or numbers, or their equivalent, set down
by handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostatting,
photographing, magnetic impulse, mechanical or
electronic recording, or other forms of data
compilation.’11
3 Peter Lyman and Hal R. Varian, How Much
Information? at
http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/
how-much-info-2003/.
4 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rules 16(b)(5); 26(a)(1)(B), 34(a),
(b); 37; 45(a)(1)(C).
5 Bruce H. Nearon, Jon Stanley, Steven W. Teppler
and Joseph Burton, ‘Life After Sarbanes-Oxley:
The Merger of Information Security and
Accountability’, Jurimetrics Journal, Vol. 45, No. 4,
Summer 2005, 379, 387.
6 Compare St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp,
Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D. Tex, 1999), digital
data taken from the internet described as ‘voodoo
information’ with D & H Auto Parts, Inc. v. Ford
Marketing Corp., 57 F.R.D. 548, *552
(E.D.N.Y.1973) ‘In relying upon data processing by
a machine, there should be no more necessity for
oral testimony concerning the reliability of the
machine operations than that of the manual
procedure supplanted, whether it be bookkeeping,
order preparation, or mathematical computation’.
7 Fed. R. Evid. Rule 901(b)9.
8 Fed. R. Evid. Rule 803(6). Curiously, the F.R.E. Rule
807 residual hearsay exception rule makes no
mention of data compilations.
9 Fed. R. Evid. Rule 901(b) 7, 8.
10 Fed. R. Evid. Rule 1002.
11 Fed. R. Evid. Rule 1002.
DIGITAL DATA AS HEARSAY
9© Pario Communications Limited, 2009 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 6
F.R.E. Article X: digital data as ‘source’ data
With the vast majority of all information generated
today originating as electronic or computer-generated
data, the inescapable conclusion to be drawn is that
digital data will become the main source of evidence
used in modern litigation. Despite this massive shift in
specie of evidence, there has been a relative paucity of
judicial authority, and certainly no emergent majority
view dealing with the vagaries inherent in respect of
computer-generated information and the directions for
its admissibility into evidence.
As early as the late 1970’s, judges have written about
the need to amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to
reflect the unique evidentiary issues presented by the
inherently ephemeral nature of computer-generated
data.12 Unfortunately, the current Federal Rules of
Evidence do not directly address the unique
authentication or admissibility issues raised by this
massive shift from evidence in physical format to
evidence in digital format.13 It is hoped that the recent
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will
accelerate corresponding amendments to the Federal
Rules of Evidence.14 Until such a time, attorneys and
judges will continue to deal with inconsistent, and at
times contradictory evaluative admissibility frameworks
for digital evidence.
Adding to this unwieldy and inconsistent framework is
a general lack of understanding by attorneys and judges
of what constitutes computer-generated information,
and what constitutes ‘source information’. The source
data of all computer-generated information is binary in
nature, and the data processed, viewed, printed out, or
stored is composed of ordered sets of zeroes and ones.15
This binary data are acted upon (processed) by other
ordered sets of binary data comprising the operating
system and other data processing software applications
to produce what are commonly referred to as a data
files.16 ‘Source’ data are, therefore always comprised of
zeroes and ones that are then processed, or rendered,
by the operating system and various applications to
produce files. These files are generally further
processed by other applications to produce images that
can be viewed on a screen, or can be viewed by printing
the data out on to paper.17 Nevertheless, the source data
for either an image viewed on a screen or a computer-
generated paper printout are the binaries, or the
ordered sets of zeroes and ones, that comprise the true,
or source data, used to produce the screen image or
paper printout. The data (or information) actually read
or perceived by a human reader (or members of a jury)
should therefore be considered the last ‘view’ in a set of
a ‘views of views’ and not the ‘source’ or origination
data.18 In other words, while a person might read, hear
or see computer-generated data, it is impossible to
read, hear, or see source computer-generated source or
origination data. In order to perceive source computer
data as native data, it is necessary to interpret the
language in which that data is written (such as ‘C’ or
‘Visual Basic’). In order to interpret the language in
which data is written, it is necessary in turn to
understand the language in which it is written. The
ultimate aim in understanding or examining computer-
generated information is to understand the assertions,
or speech, of the computer programmers (all of which
are human) who by object code or source code provide
the instructions to computers to make conditional
statements.
Admissibility generally
The procedural schema in the United States ‘requires
the parties to present trial evidence pursuant to rules
that make it clear when proof has been formally
proffered before it is introduced and then may be
considered by the trier of fact in resolving fact issues.
12 2 McCormick on Evidence §294 (6th edition, 2006),
Commonwealth v. Klinghoffer, 564 A.2d 1240 (Pa.
1989); in a noted 1976 dissent, Judge Van
Graafeiland presciently pointed to the need to
amend the rules of evidence to address the
admissibility issues presented by computer-
generated information; Perma Research and
Development v. Singer Co., Van Graafeiland, J
dissenting, 542 F.2d 111, 124-26 (2nd Cir.1976): It is
unfortunate that more than three decades later, no
such amendments have been adopted, and the
current inconsistent approach to authentication
and admissibility is the direct result of that failure
to amend.
13 2 McCormick on Evidence §294 (6th edition 2006).
14 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rules 16(b)(5); 26(a)(1)(B), 34(a), (b);
37; 45(a)(1)(C).
15 Bruce H. Nearon, Jon Stanley, Steven W. Teppler,
and Joseph Burton, ‘Life After Sarbanes-Oxley: The
Merger of Information Security and
Accountability’.
16 Bruce H. Nearon, Jon Stanley, Steven W. Teppler,
and Joseph Burton, ‘Life After Sarbanes-Oxley: The
Merger of Information Security and Accountability’
at 388.
17 Bruce H. Nearon, Jon Stanley, Steven W. Teppler,
and Joseph Burton, ‘Life After Sarbanes-Oxley: The
Merger of Information Security and Accountability’
at 388.
18 There is much confusion as to the term ‘original’
as it applies to computer-generated data. The
phrase ‘first instantiation’ (which implies ‘origin’)
rather than ‘original’ is used with good reason,
and exemplifies one of the challenges in adapting
the application of the Federal Rules of Evidence to
computer-generated information. The commonly
used definition for original is incompatible with the
concept of ‘initial’ ‘first’ or ‘earliest’ with ‘only.’
This definition has no inherent value in respect of
digital evidence. ‘Original’ digital data files can be
reproduced in exact bit for bit copies. Unlike paper
‘originals’ there may never be ‘only one’ original.
Data files may in fact, be ‘duplicate originals’
created at different times. First instantiation, or
origin, however, refers to the characteristics of the
source of the data, the environment (including
controls) and provenance of the initial creation of
digital data. Thus, the adoption and substitution of
the term, ‘first instantiation’ for ‘original’ is
suggested as more appropriate. It should also be
noted that the adoption of this term also permits a
disambiguation of the term ‘time’ for digital data
creation. While ‘first instantiation’ can have only
one time reference as it relates to data creation,
‘original’ data can be created at many different
times.
DIGITAL DATA AS HEARSAY
10 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 6 © Pario Communications Limited, 2009
The proponent needs to know how to introduce
evidence, the opponent must know when to object, and
the judge needs to know when to rule. The rules of
practice concerning presentation of evidence, offers of
proof, and objections all are designed to secure this
result.’19 To this end, the F.R.E. provides the contextual
groundwork (further interpreted by case law) in
accordance with which counsel may offer evidence, or
challenge, impeach, or rebut such evidence. The F.R.E.,
together with case law precedent, provides guidelines
for a court in determining evidentiary rulings.
The provisions of the F.R.E. lend themselves to a flow
chart of actions that must be taken by a party
submitting digital evidence, and decisions to be made
by a judge, before any such admission into evidence.
19 1 McCormick on Evidence §51 (6th edition).
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The decision points of this flow chart are not fixed,
and, subject to existing precedent, they provide a judge
with the discretion to determine the admissibility of an
item of evidence. Moreover, attorneys are aware that
evidence, whether a thing, a record, a photograph, or
testimony, is not admitted automatically into trial for
scrutiny by a jury or judge. For reasons not pertinent to
this discussion (such as privilege and prejudice)
computer-generated information sought to be admitted
(and otherwise admissible) may be excluded (or not
permitted to be used at trial).20 It should be understood
that whilst any point reached along the F.R.E. flow chart
discussed in this article may be favourably met,
admission is not necessarily guaranteed by laying a
proper foundation for authentication, or by the
applicability of a hearsay exception.
Generally, therefore, all relevant evidence that is not
privileged is admissible.21 Once the initial hurdles of
relevancy, privilege, prejudice, and such like have been
met by a party offering the evidence, evidence must be
authenticated by some means that satisfy the
requirements of 901(a) F.R.E. that evidence ‘is what it’s
proponent claims’, or, as more commonly stated, that
evidence ‘is what it purports to be.’22
‘Traditional’ authentication
In order for evidence to be admissible, it must be
identified or authenticated by extrinsic evidence in a
manner that complies with F.R.E. Rule 901(a). Examples
of methods of authentication are set forth in F.R.E. Rule
901(b). Such methods include the testimony of a
witness or witnesses with knowledge, expert opinion,
distinctive characteristics ‘and the like,’ or the efficacy
of a particular method or process in producing a
particular result.23
‘Traditional’ hearsay
While F.R.E. Rule 901 addresses authentication as a pre-
condition to admissibility, F.R.E. 801 refers to the
exclusion of hearsay evidence even if the party offering
the evidence lays a proper foundation for
authentication. Accordingly, Article VIII of the Federal
Rules of Evidence effectively imposes a post-
authentication requirement that a hearsay
determination be made as a second pre-condition to
admissibility. In order to be admissible, therefore, the
evidence offered must first be authenticated or it is
excluded. Even if authenticated, the evidence is
excluded if deemed hearsay, unless the evidence falls
under an exception to the hearsay rule.24 The result,
which is common to the operations of Rule 901
(authentication) and Rule 801 (hearsay rule), is to
permit or preclude the admissibility of evidence at trial.
The authentication provisions of F.R.E. Rule 901 and the
hearsay exclusionary provisions of F.R.E. 801 may
therefore be considered to occupy equal status in
respect of admissibility. Finally, the Federal Rules of
Evidence permit post-admission introduction before a
jury of relevant evidence pertaining to ‘weight or
credibility.’25
Once authenticated, evidence may be deemed
hearsay and inadmissible, or it may be deemed hearsay
but falling under an exception to the hearsay
exclusionary rule, in which case the evidence maintains
its admissible status.
Hearsay, which is defined as an out-of-court
statement made by a declarant at a trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, is generally not admissible.26 There are,
however, certain exceptions to the hearsay rule, where,
under certain conditions, a court is permitted (but not
required) to admit evidence that would otherwise
constitute inadmissible hearsay.27 One major exception
is provided for by F.R.E. Rule 803(6), and is typically
referred to as the Business Records Exception. The
residual hearsay exception provided by F.R.E. Rule 807
permits admissibility of other types of hearsay based
upon equivalent showings of circumstantial
trustworthiness (such as those enumerated in Rules
803 and 804).28
Lack of uniformity in the judicial approach
There is no uniformity of approach in lower court
decisions towards the issue of authentication and
admissibility of computer-generated information offered
as evidence for trial. The issue is complicated by the
absence of any United States Supreme Court guidance
as to whether digital data is inadmissible hearsay, or
not. This lack of Supreme Court guidance has not
escaped judicial notice.29 Some judges appear to view
all computer-generated information as hearsay, perhaps
saved from exclusion by qualifying under the business
records exception.30 Other judges do not consider
certain types of computer-generated data as hearsay,
20 Fed. R. Evid. 104 (a), 402 (relevance); 403
(prejudice, waste of time); 501 (privilege).
21 Fed. R. Evid. §§401, 402.
22 Fed. R. Evid. 901(a)
23 Fed R. Evid. Rules §§901(b)(1), (3), (4) and (9).
24 Fed. R. Evid. Rules 803, 807.
25 Fed. R. Evid. Rule 104(e).
26 Fed. R. Evid. Rule 801(c).
27 Fed. R. Evid. Rule 803.
28 Fed. R. Evid. Rule 807.
29 Hawkins v. Cavalli 2006 WL 2724145 (N.D. Cal
2006).
30 St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F.
Supp. 2d 773 (S.D. Tex, 1999).
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By categorizing computer-generated information only as a
subset of business records, judges have thus been able to
avoid the central issues that are uniquely inherent to the
authentication of computer-generated information. 
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and only require an F.R.E. Rule 901(b)(9) showing that
the evidence is an accurate result from a system or
process. In more recent decisions, however, judges have
tended to consider a higher degree of evidential
reliability, even for laying a foundation under F.R.E. Rule
901.31
The approach to electronic evidence posted on the
internet by one judge, seems to indicate a marked
disinclination to admit computer-generated information
by labelling such data ‘voodoo information’ incapable of
finding a basis for admission under the ‘most liberal’
interpretation of the hearsay exception rules.32 The
Court in the St. Clair case places much emphasis on its
understanding (some of it presumably apocryphal) of
computer-generated data:
Anyone can put anything on the Internet. No web-site
is monitored for accuracy and nothing contained
therein is under oath or even subject to independent
verification absent underlying documentation.
Moreover, the Court holds no illusions that hackers
can adulterate the content on any web-site from any
location at any time. For these reasons, any evidence
procured off the Internet is adequate for almost
nothing, even under the most liberal interpretation of
the hearsay exception rules found in Fed.R.Civ.P.
807.33
Other judicial authority accords a greater degree of
presumptive trustworthiness or reliability to computer-
generated information and is friendlier to its admission
as evidence. The United States District Court for the
Central District of California, relying on a 9th Circuit
precedent, specifically eschews the St. Clair approach in
favour of admitting print-outs of computer logs from a
web site.34 Although the court in Perfect 10
acknowledges a reduced evidentiary standard in
preliminary injunction motions, it nevertheless ruled
certain print-outs of web pages admissible after
considering the declaration of the party offering the
print-outs together with the circumstantial authenticity
of the content (internet domain address and the date of
the print-outs).35 Nevertheless, neither the St. Claire nor
the Perfect 10 decisions provide any substantive basis
for concluding that computer generated information is,
or is not, hearsay.
Efforts to date to categorize computer-generated
information as hearsay or non-hearsay for purposes of
admission into evidence at trial have been far from clear
– indeed, contradictory at times. To date, the Supreme
Court has not offered an opinion on the issue.36 It is
generally agreed that most judges simply (and
conveniently) place digital data into the hearsay
category as business records, and impose the requisite
corresponding contemporaneity, because statements
under the F.R.E Rule 803(6) business records exception
to the hearsay rule.37 By categorizing computer-
generated information only as a subset of business
records, judges have thus been able to avoid the central
issues that are uniquely inherent to the authentication
of computer-generated information. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court recently acknowledged that:
Judicial decisions to date have largely skirted the
edge of the problem because they have been
concerned mainly with computerized records made in
the regular course of business. [Citations omitted].
Routinely prepared records, admitted pursuant to
business records acts such as 28 U.S.C. § 1732 are
well recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule,
because their regular use in the business of the
company insures a high degree of accuracy. Proof of
day-to-day business reliance upon computerized
records should therefore make less onerous the
31 In re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437 (9th Cir. BAP
2005); In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511 (C.D. Cal. 2008);
Lorraine v Markel American Life Ins Co, 241 F.R.D.
534 (D. Md. 2007; State v. Swinton, 847 A.2d 921
(Conn. 2004); Rodd v. Raritan Radiological
Associates, 860 A. 2d 1003 (N.J. Sup. A.D. 2004).
32 St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F.
Supp. 2d 773 (S.D. Tex, 1999).
33 St. Clair, 76 F. Supp. 2d 773 at 774-775. It is
probable that the judge’s reference to Rule 807 is
actually to Federal Rules of Evidence, and meant
to cite the Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 807, and
not the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
34 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc. 213
F.Supp.2d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
35 Perfect 10, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
36 Hawkins v. Cavalli 2006 WL 2724145 (N.D. Cal
2006).
37 Hawkins v. Cavalli.
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burden of laying a proper foundation for their
admission. United States v. Russo, supra, 480 F.2d
[1228] at 1239-40.38
The Klinghoffer court considered that computer-
generated information that was not categorized as a
business record as hearsay, but (unlike the court in St.
Clair), admitted the evidence on the condition of
meeting the ‘circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness’ set forth in the residual hearsay
provisions of F.R.E. Rule 807:
Where, however, a computer is programmed to
produce information specifically for purposes of
litigation, an entirely different picture is presented. Its
product, which is hearsay and conclusory, is not
admissible under 28 U.S.C. §1732 or similar state
statutes. [Citations omitted]. Under such
circumstances, a court should not permit a witness to
state the results of a computer’s operations without
having the program available for the scrutiny of
opposing counsel and his use on cross-examination.
United States v. Dioguardi, 428 F.2d 1033 (2nd Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 825, 91 S.Ct. 50, 27 L.Ed.2d 54
(1970). Moreover, such availability should be made
known sufficiently in advance of trial so that the
adverse party will have an opportunity to examine
and test the inputs, program and outputs prior to trial.
United States v. Russo, supra, 480 F.2d at 1241.39
Indeed, some state judges have made the requirements
for authenticating a business record interchangeable
with those for laying a foundation for its admissibility
under the hearsay exception.40
The implications arising from these findings of
interchangeability appear to illustrate the poorly
articulated need to incorporate a requirement of
showing trustworthiness or reliability (typically a finding
made from within the context of a hearsay
determination), into the authentication process.
It is clear that computer-generated information that is
not a business record might consist of a digital
photograph of an accident scene taken by a bystander,
a computer-generated document containing a home
inventory for insurance purposes, or a non-business
related e-mail containing allegedly defamatory matter.
None of these examples can be easily (if at all) included
in the business records category, and it is not surprising
that there is no authority directly addressing these
examples and evaluating whether they are hearsay or
not. Indeed, it appears that the drafters’ intent,
although not specifically mentioned, was to make F.R.E.
Rule 801 a limiting definition (and a limiting evidentiary
exclusion rule) such that if a specie of evidence did not
fit clearly into one of the definitions of hearsay, it was
not to be considered hearsay:
The definition [of hearsay set forth in Rule 801] does
not in terms say that everything not included within
the definition is not hearsay, but that was the
intended effect of the rule, according to the Advisory’s
Committee’s Note.). U.S. v. Hamilton, —-F.3d—-, 2005
WL 1519112, citing John W. Strong, McCormick on
Evidence, § 246, at 97 (5th edition 1999).41
With the vast amounts of digital information generated
each year, much of it non-business records, it is clear
that a well-articulated approach to computer generated
information that is hearsay that falls into F.R.E. Rule 807
will need to be developed.
Hearsay, digital data and the ‘declarant’
An increase of what at least one judge has called a ‘lack
of understanding’ of computer-generated evidence is a
new and critical complication that arises out of attempts
to define computer generated information.42 This
complication involves semantics, specifically those
relating to the concept of hearsay. Hearsay is defined as
a ‘statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.’43 A
statement is defined in part as an oral or written
assertion intended to be an assertion.44 A declarant is
defined as a person who makes a statement.45 The
Federal Rules of Evidence appear to state, therefore,
that hearsay does not exist without a declarant, and
that the pre-condition to being a declarant is that a
declarant must be a person. The semantic problems
arise from the meaning and application of the term
declarant as it appears in the various hearsay provisions
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. A literal interpretation
of F.R.E. Rule 803 is that a declarant may not be
38 Com. v. Klinghoffer, 564 A. 2d 1240, 1242-1243 (Pa
1989).
39 Klinghoffer, 564 A. 2d at 567.
40 F.D.I.C. v. Carabetta, 739 A.2d 301 (Conn. App.
1999) ‘Requirements for authenticating a
business record are identical to those for laying a
foundation for its admissibility under the hearsay
exception for business records’.
41 It is perhaps with good reason that the Supreme
Court of Connecticut noted that the divergent
views on computer-generated evidence arise in
large part from the lack of understanding by those
at the bar and the bench. State v. Swinton, 847 A.
2d 921, footnote 24 (Conn. 2004), at 938.
42 State v. Swinton, 847 A. 2d 921, footnote 24
(Conn. 2004), at 938.
43 Fed. R. Evid. Rule 801(c).
44 Fed. R. Evid. Rule 801(a).
45 Fed. R. Evid. Rule 801(b).
DIGITAL DATA AS HEARSAY
14 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 6 © Pario Communications Limited, 2009
computer data or a computer program because neither
data nor computer program is a person.46 Indeed, two
United States Circuits, and at least one District Judge
have held that where a computer generates data
without the assistance of a person, there is neither a
‘statement’ nor a ‘declarant’ and therefore no hearsay.47
Some courts have distinguished between computer
‘generated’ and computer ‘stored’ information in making
a hearsay determination.48 That line of authority is
emblematic of the result of a lack of understanding of
how computers work, as all computer information is
always first generated. There can be no storage of
computer information without generation occurring first.
Computer-generated information may then be stored,
transmitted, or even deleted, but it must exist before it
is stored, and in order to exist it must be generated.
This issue is related to the distinction between ‘original’
data, and origination, source, or first instantiation, of
computer generated information. Accordingly, an
analysis in relation to ‘generated’ and ‘stored’ data is
fiction, and creates a distinction without a difference,
although some might wish the matter was otherwise.49
Digital data is hearsay
There is a plausible argument that can be made in
support of the proposition that all digital data
constitutes some type of hearsay. Certain assumptions
must first be made. First, computer generated
information of any type, whether output, operating
system or application files or data, and even the
metadata, are statements made by a computer
programmer or like person. These statements, or
assertions, are conditional statements, which in
essence provide instructions to a computer that, given a
certain set of conditions, the computer is told to make a
statement on behalf of the computer programmer. That
statement may be another instruction, or it may be
computer generated information output by the
computer.50 The computer only generates information it
is instructed to make on behalf of the person instructing
it to make a statement.51 Contrary to popular opinion,
computers do not make mistakes, nor do they generate
any information not instructed by a human programmer
to make. If a mistake is made, it is not the computer
that makes a mistake, but the result of a mistaken
statement (i.e., an instruction or assertion) that a
computer is told by the programmer to make – whoever
the programmer may be (that is, a third person may
cause malicious software to be downloaded on to a
computer, and the computer will thus take instructions
from this software).
The Hamilton case provides a good starting example
of how a court can get it wrong, even by drawing a
conclusion that is not supported by logic. Here, the
judge determined that a file header cannot be a
statement made a person who transmits that file to
another computer over the internet. The Hamilton court
accordingly ruled that there is no hearsay because there
is no person making a declaration as required by F.R.E.
801(b). However, the commands contained in computer
programs to create a file header, to transmit a file, to
receive a file, to create a log of file creation,
transmission or receipt activities, and to enter or not
enter information into a log file, are all statements and
may be considered to be a declaration of a person, that
person being a programmer instructing a computer to
make such statement in his or her stead. The
instructions generally provide for the following analysis:
46 Stevenson v. State, 920 S.W.2d 342 (Tex.App.-
Dallas 1996). Computer not a declarant and
information generated by a computer held not to
be hearsay.
47 United States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1142
(10th Cir.2005) (file header information
accompanying pornographic images uploaded to
the internet held not to be hearsay); see also
Hawkins v. Cavalli, 2006 WL 2724145 at p. 12 (N.D.
Cal 2006) header generated by a facsimile
machine was not hearsay because “nothing ‘said’
by a machine is hearsay”).
48 Hawkins v. Cavalli.
49 The author has experienced first-hand attempts to
delineate between ESI ‘generated’, and ESI
‘stored’ in a litigation matter pending at the
publication date of this article. The author’s firm
represents the plaintiff, and requested from the
defendant electronically stored information, in
native data format, with all associated metadata,
and as generated by defendant in the conduct of
its everyday activities. The defendant produced
documents in TIFF, rather than in native data
format, claiming that while it might have
‘generated’ such information in ‘live’ or native
format, it ‘stored’ such information only as TIFF
format files. The difference between generated
and stored here is significant. The ‘generated’ ESI
here would have provided searchable content and
metadata. The TIFF files produced were not
searchable, and contained no metadata. In this
instance, the ‘first instantiation’ of data could
only be the data as generated, and not as
ultimately stored. If this matter does not settle,
the author intends to raise the issue before the
court.
50 This is demonstrated in the case of State of
Connecticut v Julie Amero (Docket number CR-04-
93292; Superior Court, New London Judicial
District at Norwich, GA 21; 3, 4 and 5 January
2007), where the police officer for the prosecution
insisted that the colour of a hyper-link proved that
the accused had clicked on to a pornographic web
site because it was red, when in fact the web
designer entered code to the web page to make it
red when viewed. For an exhaustive analysis of
this case, see Stephen Mason, general editor,
International Electronic Evidence, (British Institute
of International and Comparative Law, 2008),
xxxvi-lxxv.
51 The traditional approach to hearsay evidence has
more concerned with the elimination of second
hand evidence provided by a witness who for
some reason is not available to be cross examined
in court. This approach fails utterly when faced
with the inherent traits unique to digital evidence.
Whilst it is true that digital evidence is ultimately
generated by a computer, it is also the result of
the speech, or declaration, of at least one
computer programmer, speaking in a particular
language, and translated by the computer into
human readable output. Although the computer is
not human, the information it generates
represents the declaration of its programmers, as
to what human readable output, or statement,
should be generated.
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When a certain condition or conditions are met, I (the
computer programmer or system administrator) want
you (the computer) to say ‘this’ and nothing else, on
my behalf.
This means that a computer and computer program will
only produce information within the purview of the
instructions contained in the source code of the
application, or program, and the application or program
will only produce information intended to be created by
the declaration of the creator of that application or
program. An argument can be made, therefore, that
there is, and must always be, a person-declarant for any
computer-generated information. To find that computers
autonomously generate information independent of
direct human instruction, (as does the 10th Circuit in
Hamilton and the District Court for the Central District of
California in Hawkins) resembles anthropomorphism,
and would impart sentience into computing devices that
simply (and at least at present) does not exist.52
Moreover, the statement made by a programmer to a
computer that instructs the computer to make another
statement, such as a file header or other metadata,
illustrates the computer programmer’s desires and
intent to make his or her statement through that
computer’s processes. It is not, as so presciently stated
by Judge Van Graafeiland, merely a ‘calculation’ made a
machine with a ‘giant memory’.53 For instance, the file
header contains specific information, including a
statement made by programmer that he or she desires
to convey if certain conditions are met, including a
statement of time. Note that ultimately, programmers,
administrators and human users of a computer are
making statements. Persons make these statements,
and these statements made by these persons can easily
be deemed as declarations falling within the purview of
the hearsay rule. To date, no authority expressly adopts
this position.54 If, however, the objective is to provide for
uniformity and consistency in relation to the
authentication of digital data, the treatment of
computer-generated information generally as hearsay
would be a major step in reaching this aspiration.
Determining what is hearsay
Judicial authority appears to divide computer-generated
information into three neat categories for the purpose of
distinguishing what is hearsay. The first category refers
to the creation of computer-generated information input
into a computer solely by a person. The second category
refers to that class of computer-generated information
input into a computer in part by a person, and in part by
a computer application. The third category refers to
computer information generation created without direct
human input or assistance.55 A person creating a
memorandum using a word processing application may
exemplify the first category. The second category is
exemplified by a person creating a form for a computer
to arrange and complete. An example of the third
category of computer-generated information exists
where a computer creates a record of a transaction with
another computer. These categories will be examined
from the perspective of the traditional approach, and
will consider the complications and contradictions
either created or left unresolved by that approach.
First category: the memorandum ‘created’ by a
human
The content of a memorandum is created by a person
and is generally considered hearsay whether or not it is
also considered a business record. If the memorandum
is a business record, the provisions of F.R.E. 803(6)
must be satisfied.56 F.R.E. 803(6) requires that either the
author of the memorandum must give evidence to
provide corroborative testimony, or a ‘custodian or other
qualified witness’ must testify that the ‘data
compilation’ was ‘made at or near the time by, a person
52 The late Alan Turing is considered by many to be
the father of modern binary computing, and he
described a ‘test’ for computer independence of
thought, or sentience. The Turing Test is a
proposal for a test of a machine’s capability to
demonstrate thought. Described by Professor
Alan Turing in his paper ‘Computing machinery
and intelligence’ Mind (1950) 59, 433-460, it
proceeds as follows: a human judge engages in a
natural language conversation with two other
parties, one a human and the other a machine; if
the judge cannot reliably tell which is which, then
the machine is said to pass the test. It is
assumed that both the human and the machine
try to appear human. In order to keep the test
setting simple and universal (to explicitly test the
linguistic capability of the machine instead of its
ability to render words into audio), the
conversation is usually limited to a text-only
channel such as a teletype machine as Turing
suggested or, more recently IRC or instant
messaging;
http://www.loebner.net/Prizef/TuringArticle.html.
53 Perma Research and Development v. Singer Co.,
Van Graafeiland, J, dissenting, 542 F.2d 111, 124
(2d Cir. 1976).
54 Such analyses are most likely to be found in
dissenting opinions, and even then little
consideration is given to the analysis. The
dissenting opinion in an unpublished Virginia
case considers the issue with the intensity of a
Klieg light, but ultimately disregards the
categorization of computer-generated
information into ‘hearsay’ and ‘non-hearsay’:
‘…[i]t is unlikely that computer-generated
evidence will be offered into evidence for some
purpose other than ‘to prove the truth of a
matter asserted,’ and thus is hearsay’),
Watlington v. Commonwealth, 2000 WL 1672871
(Benton, J, dissenting and citing Randy Snyder,
‘Note, Assuring the Competency of Computer-
Generated Evidence’, 9 Computer Law Journal
103, 104 (1989). [italics added]
55 For a similar analysis, see Stephen Mason,
Electronic Evidence: Disclosure, Discovery &
Admissibility, xiii.
56 The memorandum is both an F.R.E. 803(6)
memorandum and a ‘data compilation.’ The
difference is that a memorandum has some
semantic meaning ascribed to it, transforming it
into ‘information.’ For the purpose of this
example, however, the terms are used
interchangeably.
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with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity, and if was the regular
practice of that business activity to make the ... data
compilation.’ Notably, F.R.E. Rule 803(6) also requires
that there be no indications of a lack of trustworthiness
as a precondition of admissibility.
If the memorandum is considered not to be a
business record, another traditional approach might still
deem the contents of the memorandum hearsay, and
therefore it will be necessary to comply with the pre-
condition regarding admissibility under the residual
hearsay requirements set out in F.R.E. 807. These
requirements include, amongst other things, a showing
of the ‘equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness’ required by F.R.E. Rules 803 or 804.
F.R.E. 807 therefore appears to incorporate, by
reference, the ‘no lack of trustworthiness’ standard set
forth in the business records hearsay exception
provisions of F.R.E. 803(6).
There are significant problems with this analysis. All
computer-generated information has metadata, or data
about data, generated in association with the
generation of the content itself. The question that then
arises is whether the data compilation comprising the
memorandum includes the content of the
memorandum, and the metadata associated with that
memorandum. It must be correct that the additional
data is included with the content.57 That metadata,
which is also computer-generated information, can
contain a plethora of information, including source data,
time and date information, a digital signature, routing
information, date of creation, the last time it was
viewed, modifications, the approval of a purported
person who reviewed the content, and even the
application and version of the application with which
the content was created.58 It is asserted by some, that
the generation of this data, is made without the input or
assistance from a person. In accordance with decided
authority and F.R.E. 801(b), this information could not
be considered hearsay, even if it otherwise might be
considered a business record. Thus, while the content of
the memorandum might be hearsay (whether or not a
business record), the associated metadata responsible
for all aspects of its existence and format inexplicably is
not. If the content is a person or declarant, and
metadata is anything but a person or declarant, it is
suggested that a two-step authentication process for
such computer-generated data ought to be considered.
The content of the memorandum, which is hearsay,
would first require determination under the provisions
of F.R.E. Rule 803(6) or 807. The metadata associated
with the memorandum, however, would only require
authentication under the provisions of F.R.E. 901(b)(1) or
901(b)(9). Under this analysis, the memorandum
created by a person and input into a computer could
never be considered to be created only by a person and
therefore purely hearsay under either F.R.E. 803(6) or
807. Not surprisingly, the same analysis may be used
where a person creates a form to be filled out by other
people using various forms of software.
In other words, while the content of the memorandum
would be considered hearsay, and subject to analysis as
to whether it was hearsay and therefore to be excluded,
or an exception and therefore admitted, the metadata
associated with the content would only need to be
authenticated to be admitted. Since the reliability of
metadata in some instances may be of greater
evidential significance than the content (such as where
the metadata, but not the content has been altered)
issues of reliability, when considering the position on
the status of hearsay, would attach to both the content
and the metadata. In reality, therefore, computer-
generated information in categories one and two are
one and the same, and should be treated in an identical
manner.
The element of time significantly complicates any
hearsay analysis. At issue will be what time is referred
to as it relates to the memorandum. It could be the time
that the document was created by the purported author
of the memorandum; the time stated in the content of
57 An even more intriguing possibility exists where
a person digitally signs an entire data
compilation, including metadata. The digital
signature is a representation of a statement by
the purported signer, and the metadata by
definition forms a part of that statement, even
though first instantiated by an ‘automated’
computer process.
58 Metadata is not only evidence about evidence,
but is evidence itself. Log files, master file tables,
e-mail headers and the like are all evidence of
digital events that occur within a computer, and
these digital events may, by themselves be used
to prove an assertion or claim. For example, the
time of an event associated with a memorandum
may appear in at least two areas outside the
memorandum that a human is able to view.
These times should not differ, but may well do so
in the event of time-based data manipulation.
Without access to such metadata, a party would
not have the ability to test the consistency of the
asserted time of relevancy (if not the reliability of
the time itself). A second example supporting the
production of metadata in evidence exists in the
case of ‘hybrid documents’ or documents of one
format embedded within documents of another
format. For instance, it is easy to bring together a
Microsoft Excel document into a Microsoft Word
document. In such cases, the Excel® spreadsheet
could clearly be considered metadata to the
Word® document. The Excel® document,
potentially containing relevant evidence, would
be rendered totally invisible and undetectable to
the reader perusing the document using Word.® If
a producing party converted the hybrid Word®
document to PDF format, the format conversion
process would strip all the Excel® information.
The production of all relevant metadata is
therefore critical to the efficacy of the discovery
process itself.
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the memorandum (which may differ from the time the
document is recorded as being created); the time that
the memorandum was created according to the
metadata information (i.e., file properties or file
header). In addition, other questions that might be
posed include the time typed into the memorandum,
and whether this constitutes a ‘declaration’ by a
‘person’ of the ‘time’ of the declaration. A further issue
is the time value contained in the metadata, and
whether it is a statement by the person who told the
computer to state a specific time on his or her behalf.
Arguably, it may be necessary to reconcile the ‘time’
contained in the content, or ‘hearsay’ portion of the
data compilation as being admissible as a part of a
‘declaration’ by a ‘person’ with a different ‘time’
statement (and statement it is) contained in metadata,
which may arguably only be admitted under the F.R.E.
901(b)(9) ‘accuracy of result’ rule.59
If these two ‘times’ differ substantially, and if
reliability is the new watchword for admissibility of
computer-generated evidence, there are a number of
possible permutations: (1) the computer-generated
content with the more ‘reliable’ time is admissible, and
that the computer-generated information content
considered ‘less reliable’ is excluded, (2) that the entire
data compilation, including content and metadata, must
be excluded, or (3) that the entire data compilation is
admissible. It is respectfully submitted that none of
these options can be preferred, because the current
criteria for categorizing and evaluating computer-
generated information are contradictory, cumbersome,
and ill-suited to accomplish the task. For example, the
first choice would mean a court excludes metadata and
admit content, or admit metadata but exclude content,
both of which would defeat any possibility of
establishing the provenance of the computer-generated
information offered as evidence. Excluding or admitting
the entire data compilation might obviously serve to
further the purpose of one party, but it certainly would
detract from the integrity of the evidentiary process in
particular, and the efficacy of trial proceedings in
general.
Characterizing all computer generated information as
hearsay, and imposing a ‘reliability’ requirement as an
exception to the exclusionary rule, would avoid these
artificially created distinctions.
Second category: digital data generated in part
with human assistance
As discussed above, no computer data can be created or
generated by a human without some associated data or
metadata, generated by the computer itself.
Accordingly, and in this way, computer-generated
information described in the first and second categories
are identical.
Third category: digital data generated without a
human being 
In this category, metadata created during the generation
of computer information, such as a file header (or data
about data) created during an upload of a image file to
a remote computer, has been held not to be hearsay
because, using a strict application of the hearsay rule,
there was no ‘person’ making a declaration. In U.S. v.
Hamilton, 412 F3d 1138, 2005 WL 1519112 (10th Cir.
2005) the court held:
The district court in this case correctly concluded that
the header information that accompanied each
pornographic image was not hearsay. Of primary
importance to this ruling is the uncontroverted fact
that the header information was automatically
generated by the computer hosting the newsgroup
each time Hamilton uploaded a pornographic image
to the newsgroup. In other words, the header
information was generated instantaneously by the
computer without the assistance or input of a person.
As concluded by the district court, this uncontroverted
fact clearly places the header information outside of
Rule 801(c)’s definition of ‘hearsay.’ In particular, there
was neither a ‘statement’ nor a ‘declarant’ involved
here within the meaning of Rule 801.
In this instance, a cogent argument appears to be made
to the effect that the computer-generated information
created by a remote computer during the process by
which the remote computer receives computer-
generated information transmitted to it from another
computer is not a statement of a person, and therefore
not hearsay. In this instance, both metadata information
(file header, IP address) as well as the content created
by the remote computer might be considered not to be
hearsay and subject only to the ‘accuracy of result’
59 As discussed above, a third possibility is for a
court to consider metadata as hearsay, as the
declaration of a person in the position of a
computer system or network administrator, a
computer programmer, and the like. In that case,
the admissibility of both the memorandum (if
deemed hearsay) and its associated metadata
would be predicated upon complying with the
appropriate requirements of admissibility
provided under F.R.E. 803(6) or F.R.E. 807.
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requirement of F.R.E. 901(b)(9). The argument against
this logic and in favour of determining the data
transmitted to be hearsay, is that the receiving
computer is carrying out the stated intent or declaration
of the system or network administrator, or a
programmer, to carry out some request that the
receiving computer was told by the sending computer,
which in turn was requested by a statement or
declaration of the person or sender.
It is suggested that all computer generated
information is hearsay of some sort, and the issues
raised by the creation of the artificial distinctions
between human generated computer information and
non-human generated computer generated information
illustrate that ultimately, these categories are merely
distinctions without a difference.
Constitutional issues – digital data as
speech
In a recent decision from the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals,60 the court determined that computer
language, including object code as well as source code,
to be ‘speech’ for purposes of the First Amendment:
Having concluded that computer code conveying
information is ‘speech’ *450 within the meaning of the
First Amendment, we next consider, to a limited
extent, the scope of the protection that code enjoys.
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley 273 F.3d 429,
*449 -450 (2d Cir. 2001)
But the fact that a program has the capacity to direct
the functioning of a computer does not mean that it
lacks the additional capacity to convey information,
and it is the conveying of information that renders
instructions ‘speech’ for purposes of the First
Amendment. The information*448 conveyed by most
‘instructions’ is how to perform a task.’ Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley 273 F.3d 429, *447-448 (2d Cir.
2001).
Programmers use snippets of code to convey their
ideas for new programs; economists and other
creators of computer models publish the code of their
models in order to demonstrate the models’ vigor.
Brief of Amici Curiae Dr. Harold Abelson et al. at 17;
Brief of Amici Curiae Steven Bellovin et al. at 12-13;
see also Bernstein v. United States Department of
Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1141 (9th Cir.) (concluding that
computer source code is speech because it is ‘the
preferred means’ of communication among computer
programmers and cryptographers), reh’g in banc
granted and opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th
Cir.1999). Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley 273
F.3d 429, *448 (2d Cir. 2001).
Reinforcing the conclusion that software programs
qualify as ‘speech’ for First Amendment purposes-
even though they instruct computers-is the
accelerated blurring of the line between ‘source code’
and conventional ‘speech.’ There already exist
programs capable of translating English descriptions
of a program into source code. Trial Tr. at 1101-02
(Testimony of Professor Andrew Appel). These
programs are functionally indistinguishable from the
compilers that routinely translate source code into
object code. These new programs (still apparently
rudimentary) hold the potential for turning ‘prose’
instructions on how to write a computer program into
the program itself. Even if there were an argument for
exempting the latter from First Amendment
protection, the former are clearly protected for the
reasons set forth in the text. As technology becomes
more sophisticated, instructions to other humans will
increasingly be executable by computers as well.
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley 273 F.3d 429,
*448 (2d Cir. 2001).
… but … code, because it uses a notational system
comprehensible by humans, is communication that
qualifies as speech. Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Corley 273 F.3d 429, *449 (2d Cir. 2001)
Even object code, source code, as well as developer’s
remarks from uncompiled code have been held to
comprise ‘speech’ for purpose of the First Amendment.61
Accordingly, if computer generated information is held
‘speech’ for purpose of the First Amendment, it has to
be questioned as to why it has deprecated to the status
of ‘non-speech’ for hearsay purposes. This dichotomy
has serious implications in criminal proceedings.
60 Universal City Studios, Inc., v. Corley 273 F.3d 429
(2d Cir. 2001) 447-450.
61 The defendants asserted at oral argument that
DeCSS, or some versions of it, contain
programmer’s comments, ‘which are non-
executable appendages to lines of executable
code.’ Tradescape.com v. Shivaram, 77 F.Supp.2d
408, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Such comments are
protected by the First Amendment: Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes 82 F.Supp.2d 211, *220
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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Crawford v Washington – testimonial
hearsay and sixth amendment rights 
The decision in Crawford v Washington62 generally holds
that a Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination will
arise where testimonial hearsay is used to establish an
element of a crime or used to convict. Consider the
application of this to computer-generated information
used to convict or to establish an element of a crime.
When considered, for example, in respect of the output
of a blood alcohol testing appliance or other
electronically stored evidence, the issue of whether ESI
is hearsay takes on new and increased significance. If
such computer-generated evidence (the blood alcohol
testing device is a computer) is testimonial hearsay, a
defendant will be entitled to cross examine the source
code and object code in order to establish his or her
innocence.
Computer code and output has the ability to ‘speak’
for someone, and at times this ‘someone’ can be a coder
or programmer. In an exhibit to a software patent issued
by the US Patent and Trademark Office, the patentee
included his uncompiled source code as an exhibit. In a
criminal matter, as a defendant, it might be necessary to
know how the computer code in a device that was
instrumental in providing evidence that a crime was
committed, might have so failed. Under the doctrine in
Crawford v Washington, the defendant would be
guaranteed the right under the Sixth Amendment to
cross examine the ‘code’ or speech of the programmer,
and perhaps even the programmer. If, however, the
computer code, or computer generated information,
was deemed not to be hearsay, the right to examine
either the computer source code or the programmer
might not be guaranteed.
The Supreme Court recently expanded the application
of the Crawford doctrine and appears to be edging
toward an understanding that a computer might indeed
be the declarant uttering testimonial hearsay, thereby
enabling the defendant the right of cross examination
under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. In
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, —- S. Ct. —- 2009 WL
1789468 (2009), the court determined that a drug
testing examiner’s certificate (considered equivalent to
an affidavit) was both accusatory and testimonial, thus
permitting cross examination. The court reasoned that
such certificates were created with the sole intent to be
used as evidence at trial, and that under Massachusetts
law, the sole purpose of the certificate was to provide
prima facie evidence of composition, quality and net
weight. This evidence was clearly both testimonial and
accusatory:
The certificates here are affidavits, which fall within
the “core class of testimonial statements” covered by
the Confrontation Clause, id., at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354.
They asserted that the substance found in petitioner’s
possession was, as the prosecution claimed, cocaine
of a certain weight-the precise testimony the analysts
would be expected to provide if called at trial. Not
only were the certificates made, as Crawford required
for testimonial statements, “under circumstances
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to
believe that the statement would be available for use
at a later trial,” id., at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354, but under
the relevant Massachusetts law their sole purpose
was to provide prima facie evidence of the
substance’s composition, quality, and net weight.
Petitioner was entitled to “be confronted with” the
persons giving this testimony at trial. Id., at 54, 124
S.Ct. 1354.’
The court further held that such certificates are the
functional equivalent of testimony given in court:
The fact in question is that the substance found in the
possession of Melendez-Diaz and his co-defendants
was, as the prosecution claimed, cocaine-the precise
testimony the analysts would be expected to provide
if called at trial. The “certificates” are functionally
identical to live, in-court testimony, doing “precisely
what a witness does on direct examination.” Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165
L.Ed.2d 224 (2006).
At the heart of the court’s extension of the Crawford
doctrine is the notion of reliability that can be tested.
The court found that the aim of the Confrontation
Clause is to ensure evidentiary reliability, but confirms
that the guarantee is procedural rather than
substantive. Moreover, from a procedural context, the
Confrontation Clause not only requires reliability, but a
method to assess, or test that reliability:
To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure
reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather
than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed
in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of
cross-examination. ... Dispensing with confrontation
because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to
dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is
62 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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It appears that perhaps in future decisions, the reliability of computer-
generated information (testable accuracy and trustworthiness) may be
made a precondition for admissibility, rather than a factor to be accorded
post-admission weight by a trier of fact.
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obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth
Amendment prescribes. 541 U.S., at 61-62, 124 S.Ct.
1354.
Footnote five to the Melendez-Diaz decision provides a
tantalizing hint, and perhaps only a hint, that the court
might entertain an appeal based on the Confrontation
Clause in connection with the reports (not maintenance
reports) created by Breath-a-lyzer (blood alcohol
testing) appliances. The argument might be that the
output of the appliance (a computer) is ultimately both
accusatory and testimonial; that the code, or language
used to create the accusatory output will be considered
testimonial hearsay, and accordingly that a defendant
that is accused of having a higher-than-legal blood
alcohol levels based on such appliances, will be
afforded the right to examine the code under the Sixth
Amendment confrontation clause. A future decision will
be interesting, because the report of the breath-a-lyzer
itself will need to be deemed a form of hearsay as a
predicate for any Confrontation Clause analysis:
Respondent and the dissent may be right that there
are other ways-and in some cases better ways-to
challenge or verify the results of a forensic test.FN5
But the Constitution guarantees one way:
confrontation. We do not have license to suspend the
Confrontation Clause when a preferable trial strategy
is available. (p. 8)
FN5. Though surely not always. Some forensic
analyses, such as autopsies and breathalyzer tests,
cannot be repeated, and the specimens used for other
analyses have often been lost or degraded.
It appears that perhaps in future decisions, the
reliability of computer-generated information (testable
accuracy and trustworthiness) may be made a
precondition for admissibility, rather than a factor to be
accorded post-admission weight by a trier of fact. In the
absence of a new evidence rule directed to the
admissibility of digital evidence, the characterization of
digital information as hearsay would at least require a
demonstration of some degree of testable reliability as
a precondition for admissibility.
Computers that accuse 
An example of the confusion arising from the failure to
determine whether digital data is hearsay or not, is
perhaps best exemplified by recent opinions in criminal
cases. These decisions focus on the admissibility of
information generated by what are commonly known as
‘breath-a-lyzer’ machines, or computers that measure
an automobile driver’s breath-alcohol levels. A court in
Texas has held that:
The Intoxilyzer instrument self-generates data. [It]
cannot be a declarant. Because the Intoxilyzer is not a
declarant, the data it generates is not a statement and
cannot be hearsay.63
A few recent cases have undertaken a different analysis.
A Florida court has required that under the Florida full
information law, the source code used in a breath-a-
lyzer machine must be produced for examination by the
state.64 The court stated in pertinent part that:
An instrument or machine that can be used by the
State to establish the guilt of an accused subjecting
them to mandatory fines, mandatory loss of driving
privileges, and loss of freedom (sometime mandatory)
should be made available to the defense for open
inspection … [The disclosure of ] full information
should include the software that runs the instrument.
To construe the statute otherwise, is tantamount to
granting the state authority to use confidential
information (i.e., the software code) to establish the
guilt of a criminal defendant … The software is an
integral part of the intoxilyzer. Unless the defense can
63 James v. State, 2000 WL 1665126 at *2 (Tex.App.-
Dallas 2000) citing Stevenson v. State.
64 F.S.A. Chapter 316, §316.1932(1(f)(4).
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see how the intoxilyzer breathalyzer works …, it
remains as stated by the Court in Muldowny and more
recently by Judge Ralph E. Erikkson as being nothing
more than a ‘mystical machine’ used to establish an
accused’s guilt. State v. Lentz, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Supp.
806(a) (18th Judicial Circuit, Seminole County, April
29, 2005).65
The court did not address the hearsay issue, but the
analysis clearly indicates that computer code is used to
establish guilt. The device does not keep any samples
of the breath provided by a suspect driver, and the only
evidence is the information processed by the appliance.
It is inescapable that the computer information
generated by the Intoxilyzer therefore accuses (or
exonerates) a defendant, and this information is
‘spoken’ by the code contained in the device. The code
conveys information, and that information is the
programmer’s statement, or declaration. For example, a
recent patent issued by the United States Patent Office
included some uncompiled source code that contained
the comment ‘If this fails, we are f*d.’66 It should be
pointed out that an officer who administers the
Intoxilyzer test does not determine or asses whether a
suspect driver has an blood alcohol level above the limit
set by law. Accordingly, the only ‘testimony’ for blood
alcohol level can come from the Intoxilyzer itself, or
more specifically, the code that speaks to that
information.67
The issue as to whether computer-generated
information is or is not hearsay may eventually be
resolved under the standard articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington.68 In
that opinion, the Supreme Court held generally that the
use of testimonial hearsay automatically invokes a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation. A
future case might present a series of facts that includes
the use of computer-generated information, not
generally considered hearsay (such as the output of an
Intoxilyzer) but which may nonetheless be considered
testimonial. If computer-generated information is held
to be testimonial in nature, it would not take a quantum
leap in analysis to find that such testimony is hearsay,
even when uttered by a computer.
Reliability of digital data
More recent judicial authority appears to indicate a
trend away from considering the need to authenticate
digital data, whether determined to be hearsay or not,
in favour of a more general and flexible concern for
reliability.69 When evidence codes were first developed,
there was a preference for personal testimony over
documentary testimony because personal testimony
was considered more reliable. Over time, admissibility
rules have been developed for the introduction of
documentary evidence, with reliability as the
touchstone to admission.
The modern requirement for reliability appears to be
the result of the merger of the ‘accuracy of result’ test
embodied in F.R.E. Rule 901(b)(9), the ‘trustworthiness’
test enumerated in F.R.E. Rule 803(6), with the
‘circumstantial guarantees’ test enumerated in F.R.E.
Rule 807. Hints of this merger have appeared as early as
1987: ‘The principal precondition to admission of
documents as business records pursuant to Fed.R.Evid.
803(6) are that the records have sufficient indicia of
trustworthiness to be considered reliable.’70 Other
courts have, in more recent decisions, included the
concept of reliability into determining admissibility
where digital data, whether considered hearsay or not,
is being offered into evidence.
The basis for determining the reliability of computer-
generated information differs greatly from that of
physical evidence. Although the provenance of the
evidence must still be established, the requirements in
respect of digital data are not the same as physical
evidence. Simply put, it is not old wine in new bottles.
On the one hand, it is possible to observe the process
by which a human controls and applies pen to paper,
and forensic tests can be performed to assist in and
corroborate witness testimony in connection with a
determination as to the authenticity of the document.
On the other hand, it is not certain (and certainly
without access to and interpretation, or translation of
the source or origination data and code) how a
computer is programmed to speak for its programmers
or content creators. This lack of knowledge means the
reliability of the data may not be certain.
Digital data comprises a different specie of evidence.
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65 State of Florida v. Jack Irish, et al., Case No. 2006-
CT-02109 SC (County Court, 12th Judicial Circuit,
FL 2006).
66 United States Patent Number 5,619,571 Page 30.
67 But see U.S. v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225 (4th Cir.
2007) holding that a toxicology laboratory
testing machine data output was not the out of
court statement of the laboratory technician, and
appears to eschew the notion that computer
generated information is testimonial hearsay,
and therefore not subject to Crawford’s Sixth
Amendment confrontation rights. Note that this
decision holds merely that the testing machine’s
output is not the statement of the laboratory
technician, and does not address whether the
machine’s statement is the statement of the
program (and programmer) that generated the
data.
68 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
69 For example, see Lorraine v Markel American Ins.
Co., 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007); In re Vee
Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437 (9th Cir. BAP 2005).
70 Potamkin Cadillac Corp. v. B.R.I. Coverage Corp.,
38 F.3d 627, 632 (2nd Cir.1994); Saks Intern., Inc.
v. M/V Export Champion, 817 F.2d 1011, 1013 (2nd
Cir. 1987).
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It is designed to be ephemeral, although note that there
is a difference between ‘wiping’ or expunging data, and
changing digital data. To thoroughly expunge data from a
single computer requires more that merely downloading
and running a wiping utility. There are many locations on
the hard disc that might either contain a pointer to an
earlier version of data, or a copy of data that might
otherwise be considered irretrievable. For instance, the
operation of an automatic file backup in a word
processing application may save one or a number of
recent versions of a document. Moreover, evidence of the
existence of digital data (and what happened to it during
its life cycle) may be found in a master file table or other
logging operation that takes place without the knowledge
of the user. In addition, a simple erasure or deletion
typically does not expunge data, but only removes the
‘pointer’ to the data, and the data itself remains
accessible unless and until overwritten (in whole or in
part) by newly generated data. In a networked system, a
user may think she is expunging data at a workstation,
only to find that the network server automatically copies,
archives or backs up all data generated by the
workstation. That said, the distinction between
expunging data and the ephemeral nature of data may
best be explained by presuming that ephemeral digital
data relates to the difficulty of proving persistent data
integrity (some technologists might describe this as
proving ‘statefulness’), rather than whether it does or
does not exist. This characteristic should be considered
when determining reliability. Digital data is almost totally
dependent upon corroborative testimony that may have
little, if anything to do with the authenticity of the content
sought to be admitted. The criteria to ascertain admissibility
of computer-generated information must, it is suggested,
require a demonstration of heightened reliability. It addition,
it must do so in a manner that does not merely mirror the
techniques for evaluating physical evidence.
Whether couched in terms such as ‘trustworthiness,’
‘accuracy,’ or ‘truthfulness,’ the concept of reliability is
central for laying a foundation leading to the admissibility
of evidence. To the detriment of modern jurisprudence,
and within the realm of digital evidence, however, the
evolution of the concept of reliability as a precondition to
admissibility has not kept up with the revolution in
information technology. Nevertheless, there has been
some slow but steady judicial recognition of the reliability
issues that are unique and inherent to digital data. In a
seminal 2004 opinion, the Supreme Court of Connecticut
announced its new approach to computer-generated
evidence, declaring reliability as an essential pre-
condition of admissibility.71 The Swinton opinion held in
pertinent part that a trial court improperly admitted into
evidence computer enhanced photographs of bite marks
and images that purported to represent the defendant’s
dental structure as lacking a proper foundation. The
approach of the court in Swinton was to assess the
admissibility itself (rather than the weight) of computer
enhanced evidence.
It is significant that the Swinton court itself grappled
with the concept of computer-generated evidence, and
noted that there ‘is no universal definition of that
term.’72 The members of the Swinton court also
recognizes the unique evidentiary issues presented by
computer-generated evidence and
d[id] not agree with the state’s proposition that the
enhanced photographs in the present case are like
any other photographs admitted into evidence, and
we determine that, to the extent that a computer was
both the process and the tool used to enable the
enhanced photographs to be admitted as evidence,
we consider these exhibits, for the purposes of this
analysis, to be computer generated.73 [internal
footnotes omitted]
It was also noted that that the appearance of computer-
generated evidence at trials in Connecticut was limited
and typically involved business records.74 In a manner
strikingly reminiscent of Judge Van Graafeilands
dissenting comments in Perma Research, the members of
the Swinton court appear to bemoan the paucity of
understanding by both attorneys and the members of the
judiciary about the nature and issues presented by digital
data, and suggested that this lack of understanding has
contributed in turn to the scarcity of relevant authority:
Commentators have attempted to explain this lack of
case law involving basic foundational challenges to this
sort of evidence. “Although computer systems raise
serious reliability issues, the reported cases do not
adequately reflect this reality.” R. Garcia, “‘Garbage In,
Gospel Out’: Criminal Discovery, Computer Reliability,
and the Constitution,” 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1043, 1087
(1991). Why do the reported cases fail to adequately
expose the serious reliability issues raised by
computerized information? Many people, including
defense attorneys, prosecutors, judges, and juries, do
not understand computers.75
71 State v. Swinton, 847 A.2d 921 (Conn. 2004).
72 Swinton, 847 A. 2d at 937.
73 Swinton, 847 A. 2d at 938.
74 Swinton, 847 A. 2d at 938.
75 Swinton, 847 A. 2d footnote 25 at 940.
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The Swinton reliability test for admissibility of
computer-generated evidence has been accorded
increasing authority, and has been relied upon and
extended by other courts in considering the
admissibility of computer-generated (rather than
enhanced) exhibits. In a recent New Jersey decision the
court stated:
In our view, the use of a computer-generated exhibit
requires a more detailed foundation than that for just
photographs or photo enlargements. The latter “must
be proved to be faithful representations of the subject
at the time in question. Fundamentally, photographs
are deemed to be pictorial communications of a
qualified witness.” State v. Smith, 27 N.J. 433, 448,
142 A.2d 890, 899 (1958). However, considering the
reliability problems arising from computer-generated
exhibits and the processes by which they are created,
see State v. Swinton, 268 Conn. 781, 847 A.2d 921,
941-43 (2004), there must be “testimony by a person
with some degree of computer expertise, who has
sufficient knowledge to be examined and cross-
examined about the functioning of the computer”.76
In In re Homestore.com Inc. Securities Litigation, the
court found that web page print-outs bearing a URL
(Uniform Resource Locator) address and date stamp
were improperly authenticated by declaration, and did
not ‘… bear the indicia of reliability demanded for other
self-authenticating documents under Fed. R. Evid. 902.
To be authenticated, some statement or affidavit from
someone with knowledge is required; for example,
Homestore’s web master or someone else with personal
knowledge would be sufficient.’77
More recently, a bankruptcy panel for the 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld a bankruptcy court’s refusal to
admit the unopposed offer of a computer-generated
print-out consisting of an American Express cardholder’s
transactions.78 Adopting what appears to be the
blending of the business records hearsay exception
F.R.E. Rule 803(6) with the ‘accurate results’ standard
provided by F.R.E. Rule 901(b)(1) and (9) and the
‘circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness’ set forth
in F.R.E. Rule 807, the court affirmed the lower court’s
finding that ‘the electronic nature of the records
necessitated, in addition to the basic foundation for a
business record, an additional authentication
foundation regarding the computer and software
utilized in order to assure the continuing accuracy of the
records.’79
Conclusion
It has long been accepted that computers are not
‘calculators with a giant memory.’80 The prescience of
Judge Van Graafeiland’s dissenting comments in Perma
Research has been borne out by the ensuing decades of
ill-informed and often contradictory judicial authority.
Judge Van Graafeiland stated that:
as courts are driven willy-nilly into the magic world of
computerization, it is of utmost importance that
appropriate standards be set for the introduction of
computerized evidence … Although the computer has
tremendous potential for improving our system of
justice by generating more meaningful evidence than
was previously available, it presents a real danger of
being the vehicle of introducing erroneous,
misleading, or unreliable evidence. The possibility of
an undetected error in computer-generated evidence
is a function of many factors: the underlying data may
be hearsay; errors may be introduced in any one of
several stages of processing; the computer might be
erroneously programmed, programmed to permit an
error to go undetected, or programmed to introduce
error into the data; and the computer may
inaccurately display the data or display it in a biased
manner. Because of the complexities of examining the
creation of computer-generated evidence and the
deceptively neat package in which the computer can
display its work product, courts and practitioners
must exercise more care with computer-generated
evidence than with evidence generated by more
traditional means. Roberts, ‘A Practitioner’s Primer on
Computer-Generated Evidence’, 41 U.Chi.L.Rev. 254,
255-56 (1974). There are those knowledgeable in the
field of computerization who believe that new
evidentiary rules will be required to channel and
control the use of this new medium. Freed, Computer
Records and the Law Retrospect and Prospect, 15
Jurimetrics J. 207, 208 (1975).81
Judge Van Graafeiland’s dissenting comments are so
timely that they might have been written yesterday.
The proposed characterization of all computer
generated information as hearsay is supported by both
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76 Rodd v. Raritan Radiological Associates, 860 A.
2d 1003, 1011-1012 (N.J. Sup. A.D. 2004).
77 In re Homestore.com Inc. Securities Litigation,
347 F.Supp.2d 769, 782-783 (C.D.Cal. 2004).
78 In re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437 (9th Cir. BAP
2005).
79 In re Vee Vinhnee, at 444-445. [Emphasis Added]
80 Perma Research and Development v. Singer Co.,
Van Graafeiland, J, dissenting, 542 F.2d 111, 124
(C.A.N.Y. 1976).
81 Perma Research and Development v. Singer Co.,
Van Graafeiland, J, dissenting, 542 F.2d (C.A.N.Y.
1976) at 124-125.
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an examination of computer language, as well as long-
standing authority that treats computer code as
‘speech’ for purposes of the First Amendment. There is
no supportable or substantial reason to change the
meaning of computer-generated information from
‘speech’ for protecting First Amendment rights, to ‘non-
speech’ in determining whether it is hearsay, especially
in those cases where hearsay would necessarily invoke
rights under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation in
criminal matters under the Crawford v. Washington
doctrine.
In the absence of the adoption of a new evidence rule
addressing the admissibility of computer-generated
evidence, treating all computer generated information
as hearsay would eliminate low-quality evidentiary
admissibility, and provide a better ‘reliability’ standard
that is now beginning to emerge for computer-
generated information. It is strongly suggested that the
acceptance of computer-generated information as
hearsay, and the adoption of a generalized requirement
of ‘reliability’ would provide an effective and consistent
approach to the admissibility of digital data. Further, the
universal adoption of a general reliability standard
would curtail current attempts to categorize digital data
as hearsay or not, thereby eliminating what is in
essence a distinction without a difference. Moreover,
the adoption of a standard of reliability would represent
a significant step forward in the development of a
unified, flexible set of criteria to establish admissibility
for digital data.82 In the future, computer-generated
information that is (1) generated by human input, (2) by
hybrid human and computer input, (3) by the computer
only, becomes merely digital data. By deeming
computer-generated information as hearsay, such
pseudo-categorizations of computer-generated
information would be eliminated, and the requirement
of reliability could be universally imposed and uniformly
considered. In addition, the confusion between
‘computer stored’ and ‘computer enhanced’ data may
disappear, thereby removing the current illogical,
contradictory, and ultimately unworkable distinction
that surrounds digital data. Eventually, it is hoped, the
evidentiary rules will be revised to accurately reflect the
need for a flexible requirement of testable reliability as
a pre-condition for admissibility of digital data.
© Steven W. Teppler, 2009
82 A single hearsay rule applicable to the testing of
both witnesses and computer-generated
information may well prove too complex or
unwieldy. Indeed, what may work best is a new,
separate evidence rule made expressly
applicable to computer-generated evidence, and
requiring a threshold showing of testable
accuracy, reliability and trustworthiness as a pre-
requisite to admissibility.
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